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Abstract
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of
the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely,
the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophis-
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(Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative
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11 Introduction
Collusion in auctions is the topic of a number of empirical and theoretical
papers (see, e.g., Klemperer (2004), Krishna (2002), Milgrom (2004) for refer-
ences). While many auctions encountered in practice feature common values,
most theoretical articles focus on the independent private values case (see,
e.g., Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), Graham and Marshall (1987), Graham et al.
(1990), Lopomo et al. (2005), Mc Afee and Mc Millan (1992), Mailath and
Zemsky (1991), Marshall and Marx (2007), Marshall et al. (1994), Waehrer
(1999)1). Furthermore, collusion in auctions is typically viewed as a mech-
anism design problem for a given ring, which most often involves all the
bidders. This approach emphasizes the role of incentive compatibility and
individual interim participation constraints, but does not question the par-
ticipation of subgroups of bidders. By contrast, such group participation con-
straints are central to test the stability of cartels in oligopoly under complete
information (see, e.g., d￿ Aspremont et al. (1983), Bloch (1996), Donsimoni
(1985), Donsimoni et al. (1986), Ray and Vohra (1999), Ray (2007)).
In this paper, we somehow combine the two approaches and analyze the
stability of rings in a general model of auctions with common values, which
has been introduced by Einy et al. (2002). As standard in information
economics, the value of the fundamentals (namely, the common value of the
object for sale here) depends on a state of nature and the private information
of every agent is modeled by a partition of the set of states of nature. Einy
et al. further assume that these partitions are connected with respect to
the common value (i.e., if a bidder considers two values as possible given his
information, he also considers the intermediate values as possible). In this
setup, Einy et al. show that second price auctions are dominance solvable.
Among the corresponding ￿sophisticated equilibria￿ , they identify a solution
with remarkable properties.
In order to capture participation constraints of subrings, we use a ￿bridge
approach￿according to A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2009)￿ s terminology, i.e., we
associate a cooperative game with the noncooperative second price auction.
We ￿rst show that, in spite of the strategic externalities which are part of the
noncooperative game, the cooperative one can be described by a well-founded
characteristic function, which does not rely on incredible threats from coali-
1Lyk-Jensen (1997), Marshall and Meurer (2001), Mc Afee and Mc Millan (1992) and
more recently, Hendricks, Porter and Tan (2008), give insights on collusion in auctions
with common values.
2tions. More precisely, rings form ex ante, i.e., before the players learn their
private information on the value of the object. This timing is consistent with
rings observed in practice (see, e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987)). Members
of the ring fully commit to bid as recommended, which amounts to allow-
ing a benevolent ￿ring center￿to make the bids. Leaving aside the problem
of information revelation inside the ring, a natural bidding strategy for the
ring center is the strategy which is part of the solution identi￿ed Einy et al.
It turns out that this strategy does not depend on the underlying coalition
structure. We further show that, by adopting an appropriate allocation rule,
the ring can make this strategy incentive compatible even if information on
the state of nature is unveri￿able or ￿soft￿ . In particular, the grand coalition
can achieve the ￿rst best Pareto optimum.
To sum up, we construct a characteristic function, in which the worth
of a ring is its expected payo⁄ in Einy et al.￿ s solution. A ring is stable if
all its subrings agree to participate, namely if the ring can propose a core
allocation to its members or, equivalently, if the core of the characteristic
function, restricted to the ring, is not empty. Unstable rings are common in
other contexts: the viability of a cartel in a perfectly informed oligopoly may
depend on its size (see the references above), the core of an exchange econ-
omy with di⁄erential information can be empty when incentive compatibility
conditions are taken into account (see, e.g., Forges et al. (2002)), etc. In an
auction with common values, larger coalitions should make larger pro￿ts by
improving information and limiting competition but also face more partici-
pation and incentive constraints. Our main result is that, in the second price
auctions modeled by Einy et al., all rings are stable. The same property
holds in the case of second price auctions with independent private values
(see Mailath and Zemsky (1991)) but, as we shall illustrate, need not hold
in common values models in which the bidders￿information partitions are
not connected. In this case, the cooperative game between the rings may be
better described by a partition form in the sense of Lucas and Thrall (1963)
(see Barbar and Forges (2007)).
Let us come to the organization of the paper. In section 2, we recall the
main features of Einy et al.￿ s model. In section 3, we introduce an auxiliary
noncooperative second price auction, in which the players are bidding rings;
we derive some properties of Einy et al.￿ s solution in the auxiliary game; we
show in particular that this solution is incentive compatible. In section 4, we
construct the cooperative game in which core-stability can be de￿ned and
establish that all rings are core-stable. Section 5 contains some examples
3and draws some conclusions from our analysis. Finally, in an appendix, we
explain to which extent our assumptions are without loss of generality.
2 Auctions without collusion
2.1 Basic game
As in Einy et al. (2002), let N = f1;:::;ng, n ￿ 2, be the set of bidders, ￿
be the ￿nite set of states of nature and p be a probability distribution on ￿
(w.l.o.g., p(!) > 0 for every ! 2 ￿)2. The bidders participate in a second
price auction to acquire a single object. The value of the object v(!) 2 R+
is the same for all bidders and depends on the state of nature !. The private
information of bidder i, i = 1;:::;n, is described by a partition ￿i of ￿.
We assume, as in Einy et al. (2002), that the information partition ￿i of
every bidder i, i = 1;:::;n, is connected w.r.t. the common value function v,
namely that, for every element ￿i of ￿i, if !1, !2 2 ￿i and ! 2 ￿ are such
that v(!1) ￿ v(!) ￿ v(!2), then ! 2 ￿i.
The auction game, which we denote as G, starts with a move of nature
choosing ! in ￿ according to p. Every bidder i (i = 1;:::;n) is informed of
the element ￿i(!) of ￿i which contains ! and then makes a bid xi 2 R+.3
The utility ui(!;x) of player i, as a function of the state of nature ! and the
bids x = (x1;:::;xn), will be made precise below. A (pure) strategy of bidder
i is a mapping bi : ￿ ! R+, which is measurable w.r.t. ￿i, namely such that
bi is constant on every element of ￿i.
Let ￿N =
W
j2N ￿j be the coarsest partition which re￿nes all the ￿j￿ s,
j 2 N. We assume that
￿N = ff!g;! 2 ￿g, i.e.,
\
j2N
￿j(!) = f!g for every ! 2 ￿
and v(!) = ! for every ! 2 ￿ (assumption A)
If the information partitions are connected, assumption A can be made
w.l.o.g. as far as the full set of bidders N remains ￿xed (see the appendix for
2The basic reference ￿eld is the set of all subsets of ￿.
3The bidders will typically have di⁄erent information partitions; they will thus be ex
ante asymmetric. On the contrary, models with a¢ liated signals ￿ la Milgrom and Weber
(1982) are usually solved for ex ante symmetric bidders.
4details). Under assumption A, ￿ is a ￿nite subset of R+ and a state of nature
is interpreted as the bidders￿best estimate of the value of the object when
they share their information. In the sequel, we will not need to distinguish
between this best estimate and the true value of the object.
We can now make precise the utility functions ui : ￿ ￿ RN










where g(x) denotes the number of winners (i.e., g(x) =j fi 2 N : xi = maxj2N xjg j)







Einy et al. (2002) prove that the original auction game G is dominance solv-
able; they refer to the corresponding solutions of G as ￿sophisticated equi-
libria￿ . Among the sophisticated equilibria, they identify a particular equi-
librium, in ￿￿￿strategies￿ , which is computationally tractable. Under our
assumption A, the ￿￿￿strategies￿take the simple form
￿i : ￿ ! R+ : ￿i(!) = min￿i(!) = minf!
0 : !
0 2 ￿i(!)g i 2 N
The strategy ￿i of player i thus consists of bidding the smallest possible
value of the object, given his information. We observe that ￿i(!) does not
depend on the number of players. Einy et al. (2002) prove that (￿i)i2N is
a sophisticated equilibrium of G which interim Pareto-dominates all other
sophisticated equilibria. The next lemma will be useful to compute expected
payo⁄s at the equilibrium ￿.
Lemma 1
For every ! 2 ￿, maxk2N ￿k(!) = !. In particular, if ￿i(!) = ￿j(!) =
maxk2N ￿k(!) for some i 6= j, then ! ￿ ￿i(!) = 0. In other words, at the
equilibrium ￿, ex aequo winning bids cannot generate a positive pro￿t.
Proof: Let us set ￿(!) = max1￿k￿n ￿k(!). For every l, 1 ￿ l ￿ n, by
de￿nition, ! 2 ￿l(!) and ￿l(!) = min￿l(!); hence ! ￿ ￿l(!) for every l and
! ￿ ￿(!). Let us show that, for every l, ￿(!) 2 ￿l(!). This follows from
the de￿nitions if l is such that ￿l(!) = ￿(!); let thus consider l such that
5￿l(!) < ￿(!); we still have ￿l(!) 2 ￿l(!) and ! 2 ￿l(!); on the other hand,
￿l(!) < ￿(!) ￿ !; since ￿l(!) is connected, we deduce ￿(!) 2 ￿l(!). Hence
￿(!) 2 \1￿j￿n￿j(!). By assumption A, ￿(!) = !. ￿













since ex aequos give a null contribution to the payo⁄.
3 Auctions with collusion
3.1 Auxiliary game
A ring (or coalition) R is a subset of bidders. Let P be a coalition structure,
namely a partition of N. Each element of P is interpreted as a bidding ring.
For R ￿ N, let ￿R =
W
j2R ￿j be the coarsest partition which re￿nes all the
￿j￿ s, j 2 R. ￿R describes the information of ring R if all its members share
their information. From G and P, we construct an auxiliary game G(P) ￿ ￿
P;(￿;p);f￿RgR2P ;fURgR2P
￿
, in which the players are the coalitions R,
R 2 P, the information partition of R is ￿R and the utility function of R is
UR : ￿ ￿ R
N




A (pure) strategy of R in G(P) is a ￿R￿measurable mapping bR : ￿ !
R+. In G(P); ring R is a single player, with information partition ￿R. The in-
terpretation is that the members of coalition R share their information before
jointly deciding on a single relevant bid. In practice, in order that collusion
be not detected, one member of the ring makes the relevant bid and the oth-
ers make a negligible bid. The ring members also make arbitrary transfers
between each others. Information sharing is not submitted to incentive con-
straints if the bidders￿information is veri￿able (i.e., ￿hard￿ ), an assumption
which is often satis￿ed in the case of common values. If information is not
veri￿able, we show below (in lemma 3) that every ring R can implement any
relevant strategy bR by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
63.2 Coalitional equilibria
As in Ray and Vohra (1997) and Ray (2007), we de￿ne a coalitional equilib-
rium relative to P as a Nash equilibrium (bR)R2P of G(P). In particular, the
strategy ￿R of ring R is
￿R : ￿ ! R+ : ￿R(!) = min￿R(!) = minf!
0 : !
0 2 ￿R(!)g
where ￿R(!) is the element of ￿R =
W
j2R ￿j which contains !. The next
lemma further characterizes the strategies ￿R.
Lemma 2
For every R 2 P and every ! 2 ￿, ￿R(!) = maxk2R ￿k(!).
Proof: Let us assume that R = f1;2g; the general case can be deduced
by induction. Let us write 12 for f1;2g. Without loss of generality, let
us assume that ￿2(!) ￿ ￿1(!), namely that min￿2(!) ￿ min￿1(!). By
connectedness and since ￿12(!) = ￿1(!) \ ￿2(!) 6= ;, min￿2(!) 2 ￿1(!).
Hence, ￿12(!) = min￿12(!) = ￿2(!) = maxf￿1(!);￿2(!)g. ￿
In order to implement the strategy ￿R, ring R must achieve the infor-
mation partition ￿R, which raises the issue of incentive compatibility if the
information of R￿ s members is ￿soft￿ , i.e., not veri￿able. More precisely, in
the latter case, ring R must rely on a mechanism selecting bids and transfers
as a function of reports that R￿ s members make on their private information.
We assume that player i￿ s report must take the form of an estimate ei 2 R+
of the value of the object.
A mechanism ￿R ￿ (￿R;￿R) for R consists of a bid function ￿R and an
allocation rule ￿R: given an R￿tuple of reports (ei)i2R, ￿R((ei)i2R) 2 R+
is the single bid to be made by the ring and ￿R((ei)i2R) determines the
member of R who gets the object (and pays the auctioneer for it), together
with balanced monetary transfers.
Given a mechanism ￿R ￿ (￿R;￿R), we construct a revelation game be-
tween the members of R. This game takes place after that every member of
R has committed to participate in R and starts with the choice of nature
!. Every member i 2 R learns the element ￿i(!) of his information parti-
tion which contains ! and then reports an estimate ei to the mechanism. A
strategy of player i 2 R in the revelation game is a ￿i￿measurable map-
ping b ei : ￿ ! R+, which determines the estimate b ei(!) that player i reports
7to the mechanism as a function of his information. Player i￿ s payo⁄ in the
revelation game is determined by the allocation rule ￿R. Player i￿ s payo⁄
thus depends on the estimates that are reported by the other members of R
(indirectly through the bid that is made by R, which will make R win or not,
and possibly directly through the allocation rule) but also on the bids that
are made by the bidders outside the ring. The revelation game thus depends
on the bidding strategies of the players who are not in the ring.
Let P be a coalition structure; we have seen that ￿ = (￿R)R2P is a
coalitional equilibrium. For R 2 P, the mechanism ￿R ￿ (￿R;￿R) im-
plements ￿R given (￿S)S2P;S6=R if there exists an equilibrium (b ei)i2R of the
revelation game induced by ￿R and (￿S)S2P;S6=R such that for every ! 2 ￿,
￿R((b ei(!))i2R) = ￿R(!). The coalitional equilibrium ￿ = (￿R)R2P is incen-
tive compatible if, for every R 2 P, there exists a mechanism ￿R ￿ (￿R;￿R)
which implements ￿R given (￿S)S2P;S6=R.
Lemma 3
For every coalition structure P, the coalitional equilibrium ￿ = (￿R)R2P
is incentive compatible.
Proof:
Let us ￿x P and R 2 P. We must construct a mechanism ￿R ￿ (￿R;￿R)
which implements ￿R given (￿S)S2P;S6=R. Let the (relevant) bid of R be
de￿ned as ￿R((ei)i2R) = maxi2R ei for every R￿tuple of reported estimates
(ei)i2R. Let the allocation rule ￿R be de￿ned as follows, independently of the
reported estimates: if R wins the auction, then i 2 R gets the object with
probability ￿i (￿i > 0, i = 1;:::;n,
P
i2R ￿i = 1), in which case i also pays
















if ! is the state of nature, (ej)j2R is the vector of messages in R and (xk)k2NnR
is the vector of bids outside R.
We will show that (b ej)j2R = (￿j)j2R and (￿S)S2P;S6=R form an equilibrium
of the revelation game induced by ￿R and (￿S)S2P;S6=R, namely that if players
4Equivalently, if R wins the auction, every member i of R gets a share ￿i of R￿ s total
payo⁄.
8in N n R bid according to (￿S)S2P;S6=R and every member j 6= i of R reports
ej = ￿j(!) to the mechanism, then ei = ￿i(!) is a best response of player i.
From Einy et al. (2002) applied to G(P) and lemma 2, ￿R = maxi2R ￿i is
a best response of ring R against (￿S)S2P;S6=R. Applying once again lemma
2, ￿NnR = maxS2P;S6=R ￿S and proceeding as in (1),
E
￿
(e ! ￿ ￿NnR(e !))I
￿






(e ! ￿ ￿NnR(e !))I
￿




for every ! 2 ￿ and xR 2 R+. If all members of R but player i report ej =
￿j(!), the ring will not use its best response against (￿S)S2P;S6=R and player
i, whose payo⁄ is proportional to the ring￿ s payo⁄, will possibly be harmed.





￿Rni is ￿R￿measurable, we can write
E
￿
(e ! ￿ ￿NnR(e !))I
￿
















By taking expectations w.r.t. ￿i(!), which is coarser than ￿R(!), we get
E
￿
(e ! ￿ ￿NnR(e !))I
￿
















for every ! 2 ￿ and ei 2 R+. By multiplying both sides of the latter
inequality by ￿i, we conclude that player i cannot do better than ei = ￿i(!).
There remains to check that for every ! 2 ￿, ￿R((b ei(!))i2R) = ￿R(!).
By construction, ￿R((b ei(!))i2R) = maxi2R ￿i(!) = ￿R(!), where the last
inequality follows from lemma 2. ￿
Remark: If values are private and independent, an analog of lemma 3 holds
for any coalitional equilibrium of any auction game (i.e., not necessarily
second price) by relying on transfers ￿ la Groves (1973) and d￿ Aspremont
and GØrard-Varet (1979, 1982) (see Biran and Forges (2010)).
94 Core-stable rings
4.1 Cooperative game
The coalitional equilibria (￿R)R2P derived in the previous section enable us
to associate a cooperative game with the noncooperative game G.5 For every
coalition structure P and ring R 2 P, let us de￿ne the worth v(R;P) of R
in P as the expected payo⁄ of R at the equilibrium (￿S)S2P of G(P). The
equilibrium payo⁄ of coalition R 2 P at !, which we denote as v(R;P)(!),
can be computed as in (1). For individual players, (1) shows that player i
only cares about the maximal bid of the others, so that player i￿ s payo⁄ at
! does not depend on possible rings among the other players. This property















= def (R)(!) (2)
This expression con￿rms that, for every !, coalition R￿ s payo⁄at ! does not
depend on the coalition structure P, so that we can refer to it as  (R)(!).
Coalition R￿ s expected payo⁄ does not depend on P either so that the par-
tition form v(R;P) reduces to a characteristic function  :
v(R;P) =  (R) = E [ (R)(e !)]
= E
￿￿













where e ! is the random variable representing the common value of the object.
In particular,  (N) = E(e !).6
The characteristic function   is similar to the one which has been derived
for second price auctions with independent private values (see Mailath and
Zemsky (1991) and Barbar and Forges (2007)). In order to see this, let ! 2 ￿.
5We basically proceed as in Ray and Vohra (1997) and Ray (2007) even if, in our
auction model, the uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium is not guaranteed. We rather
focus on the equilibrium identi￿ed by Einy et al. (2002).
6If the grand coalition forms, only its representative bidder makes a signi￿cant bid, who
thus gets the object at zero price (recall that according to our description of the second
price auction, the seller￿ s reserve price is zero).
10If maxi2R ￿i(!) > maxj2NnR ￿j(!), then maxi2R ￿i(!) = maxi2N ￿i(!) =




















By identifying ￿i(e !) with the evaluation e vi of player i in an independent
private value model, (5) is exactly the (￿rst best) expected payo⁄ of ring
R in a second price auction at the equilibrium in dominant strategies (see
Barbar and Forges (2007)). However, such a representation is not general
at all, even in second price auctions. For instance, a partition form game
(rather than a characteristic function) may be needed to account for the
coalitions￿interaction in models of common values which do not satisfy Einy
et al. (2002)￿ s assumptions (see Barbar and Forges (2007), example 4)7.
The following property of   will be useful.
Lemma 4
The characteristic function   de￿ned by (3) is supermodular.
Proof: Recall (e.g., from Shapley (1971) or Moulin (1988)) that   is super-
modular if for every coalitions R, S such that S ￿ R and every k 2 N n R
 (R [ fkg) ￿  (R) ￿  (S [ fkg) ￿  (S) (6)
This inequality is easily checked case by case, at every ! 2 ￿. Alterna-
tively, using (4) and (5),   is basically a cost allocation game so that its
supermodularity can be deduced from standard properties (see Littlechild
and Owen (1973) or, e.g., Moulin (1988)).
More precisely, let xi 2 R+, i 2 N and x(R) = maxi2R xi for every R ￿ N;
x de￿nes a standard cost allocation game and is thus submodular. Let f be
the characteristic function de￿ned by










for every R ￿ N.
7An e⁄ective partition form game is also needed in ￿rst price auctions with independent
private values (see Biran and Forges (2010)).
11The marginal contributions of f and x are related to each other by
f(R [ fkg) ￿ f(R) = x(N n R) ￿ x((N n R) n fkg) for every R ￿ N;k = 2 R
so that f is supermodular. The result holds in particular for xi = ￿i(!),
i 2 N, and f =  (!). ￿
4.2 Core
Recall that the core of   is the set C( ) of vector payo⁄s (zi)i2N 2 RN
such that
P
i2N zi =  (N) = E(e !) and
P
i2R zi ￿  (R) for every ring
R ￿ N. C( ) can be referred to as the ex ante incentive compatible core
of the auction game G, i.e., as an analog to the solution concept previously
de￿ned for exchange economies by Forges and Minelli (2001) and Forges et al.
(2002). Indeed, the coalitional equilibria behind the characteristic function  
are incentive compatible by lemma 3 and   evaluates the worth of coalitions
as their ex ante expected payo⁄s.
If C( ) is not empty, the ring involving all the bidders can propose to
share  (N) = E(e !) in such a way that all subrings R ￿ N agree to partici-
pate. We then say that N is core-stable.
Before showing that N is indeed core-stable in our model, let us sum-
marize the commitment process behind our stability concept. Every ring R
considers to form at the ex ante stage, i.e., before the choice of the state of
nature !. If R forms, every member i 2 R must commit to participate at
that stage. R expects that the players j 2 N nR will bid according to ￿j but
need not make conjectures on possible other rings. R will use the mecha-
nism ￿R ￿ (￿R;￿R) described in the proof of lemma 3, which implements ￿R
given (￿j)j2NnR, in particular allocate the object to i 2 R with some prob-
ability ￿
R




i = 1). The mechanism guarantees
that the members of R correctly report their estimates after having received
their private information and that the sum of the ex ante expected payo⁄s
of the members of R is  (R). This scenario holds in particular for the grand
coalition N. When N considers to form, N proposes a share zi of  (N) to
every i 2 N. The vector payo⁄ z = (zi)i2N will induce ex ante participation
of every subring R (which has chosen its mechanism ￿R leading to  (R))
if and only if z 2 C( ). N achieves z by choosing the probabilities of its





The previous approach can be applied to test the stability of any speci￿c
ring R. Let  
R be the restriction of   to R, namely the characteristic function
12de￿ned by  
R(S) =  (S) for every S ￿ R. We say that R is core-stable if
C( 
R) is not empty. Cooperation in R can be studied exactly as in N, since,
as far as the ￿ strategies are chosen, R does not care about the rings that
might form outside R. As above, R chooses the probabilities of ￿R so as to







Let G be an auction game satisfying the assumptions of section 2; all
rings are core-stable in G.
Proof: By lemma 4,   is supermodular. (6) shows that, for every R ￿ N,
the same property must also hold for  
R. Using Shapley (1971), C( 
R) is
not empty. ￿
5 Examples and concluding remarks
Example 1
n = 3, ￿ = fl;m;hg, l < m < h, Pr(!) = 1
3 8!, ￿1 = fflgfm;hgg,
￿2 = ffl;mg;fhgg, ￿3 = ffl;m;hgg.
! ￿1 = ￿13 ￿2 = ￿23 ￿3 ￿12  1 =  13  2 =  23  3  12
l l l l l 0 0 0 0
m m l l m m ￿ l 0 0 m ￿ l
h m h l h 0 h ￿ m 0 h ￿ l
 123(!) = ! 8!.
Ex ante:  1 =  13 = 1
3(m ￿ l),  2 =  23 = 1
3(h ￿ m),  3 = 0,  12 =
1
3(m ￿ l) + 1
3(h ￿ l),  123 = 1
3(l + m + h).
Let R = f1;2g. ￿1 = ￿2 = 1
2 yields ex ante payo⁄s of
 12
2 to each member
of R, which may not be individually rational: if e.g., l = 1, m = 2 and h = 5,
 1 = 1
3,  2 = 1 and  12 = 5
3. Together with an ex ante transfer t, 1
6 ￿ t ￿ 1
2,
from player 1 to player 2, ex post equal sharing becomes individually rational.
For instance, the Shapley value Sh1 = 1
2, Sh2 = 7
6 can be obtained in this
way. Equivalently, (1
2; 7
6) can be achieved by choosing ￿1 = 3
10, ￿2 = 7
10.
Leaving aside the incentive problem, the Shapley value can be used as a
nice, ex post allocation rule. At ! = m, player 1 would have won at the same
13price, without player 2, hence player 1 should get the whole surplus m ￿ l.
At ! = h, the ring gets the object at price l, while, without the help of player
1, player 2 would have won it at price m; the surplus from cooperation is
m￿l, which can be shared by the two players: player 1 gets m￿l
2 and player
2 gets (h ￿ m) + m￿l
2 .
In the next example, we illustrate that the grand coalition may not be
core-stable if partitions are not connected. In this more general model, Einy
et al. (2001) establish that a player who possesses superior information has
a dominant strategy, which consists of bidding his estimated value given his
information, and that, if there is such a player, who applies his dominant
strategy, then the other players cannot expect a positive payo⁄, whatever
they bid.
Example 2
n = 3, ￿ = fl;m;hg, l < m < h, Pr(!) = 1
3 8!, ￿1 = fflgfm;hgg,
￿2 = ffl;mg;fhgg, ￿3 = ffl;hg;fmgg
The information partitions of the players are not connected. Keeping the
rules of the second price auction described in section 2.1, the expected payo⁄
of the grand coalition is  (N) = E(e !) = 1
3(l + m + h). Let us consider
any ring R involving exactly two players. Such a ring is fully informed and
has thus superior information. From Einy et al. (2001), R has a dominant
strategy (consisting of bidding ! if the state of nature is !) and if R uses
his dominant strategy, the player not in R cannot make any positive pro￿t,
whatever he bids. If we de￿ne  (R) by means of an equilibrium in which R
uses his dominant strategy and the player not in R bids 0,  (R) =  (N) for
all rings R such that j R j= 2, so that the grand coalition is not core-stable.
Small coalitions can nevertheless be made stable.
Which conclusions can we draw from our analysis?
Einy et al. (2002) model the bidders￿information in a general way, except
perhaps for the connectedness of the information partitions. This assumption
is natural enough to hold in many relevant examples. If a bidder cannot
distinguish between two endpoints of some range of values, he will likely not
be able to distinguish between the values in the entire range. In example 2,
for instance, player 3￿ s partition is not connected: his technology does not
enable him to distinguish between a low and a high value, but enables him
to assess whether the value is intermediate, which is rather odd. Another
14important feature of the model is of course the second price rule of the
underlying auction.
Under Einy et al. (2002)￿ s assumptions, we consider an arbitrary ring,
which forms exogenously (e.g., consisting of local producers in a procurement
auction) before the bidders receive their private information. We establish
that the ring can design a budget balanced incentive compatible mechanism
of collusion so that no subgroup of bidders can pro￿t from seceding from the
ring. Hence, in the absence of further speci￿cation of the auction rules, all
rings, whether large or small, will be able to enforce collusive bidding.
As we already pointed out, all rings are also core-stable in a second price
auction with independent private values (Mailath and Zemsky (1991)). Our
result is better understood by decomposing it into two parts. First, all rings
are stable in a second price auction with complete information on individual
reservation prices. Formally, this is expressed by the supermodularity of the
characteristic function  (!) de￿ned in (2) and (4), a property which was al-
ready pointed out in Graham et al. (1990). This part is lemma 4. Second, by
relying on appropriate mechanisms, rings can achieve their ￿￿rst best equi-
librium payo⁄￿ , namely overcome the ine¢ ciencies generated by information
di⁄erences, as stated in lemma 3 in the case of a common value. Barbar and
Forges (2007) similarly decompose the stability of all rings when values are
private and independent into two parts, relying on d￿ Aspremont and GØrard-
Varet￿ s techniques for the second one. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) rather
concentrate on the uni￿ed mechanism design problem of a ring, without re-
ferring explicitly to the complete information benchmark.
6 Appendix: assumption A is w.l.o.g.
Let us ￿rst show to which extent the assumption
￿N = ff!g;! 2 ￿g, i.e.,
\
j2N
￿j(!) = f!g for every ! 2 ￿
can be made w.l.o.g. in the context of Bayesian games.
Let ￿ be a ￿nite set of states of nature and p be a probability distribu-
tion on ￿, such that, w.l.o.g., p(!) > 0 for every ! 2 ￿. Let N = f1;:::;ng
be a set of players; for every i 2 N, let ￿i be a partition of ￿ describ-
ing player i￿ s private information, Ai be player i￿ s ￿nite set of actions and





be the Bayesian game generated by
these parameters. In ￿, a pure strategy ￿i of player i is a ￿i-measurable
mapping ￿i : ￿ ! Ai.
Let (￿0;p0) be constructed by identifying states that no player can distin-
guish, i.e., ￿0 = ￿N =
W
j2N ￿j and p0(￿) =
X
!2￿ p(!) for every ￿ 2 ￿0. The
players￿information partition ￿0
i are obtained by renaming the states in ￿i
in the obvious way and the utility functions u0




!2￿ p(! j ￿)ui(!;a). The construction is illustrated on
the following example:
Example A.1
N = f1;2g, ￿ = fa;b;cg, p(!) = 1
3 8!, ￿1 = ffa;bg;fcgg, ￿2 =
ffa;b;cgg
￿0 = fab;cg, p(ab) = 2
3, p(c) = 1
3, ￿1 = ffabg;fcgg, ￿2 = ffab;cgg
It is easily checked that, given the de￿nition of strategies as measurable












The previous property holds for general von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity functions ui, i.e., without assuming common values, and for general, pos-
sibly non-connected, information partitions. However, some care is needed
when ui(!;a) is originally de￿ned from a common value v(!), to be later
identi￿ed with the state of nature. Let us illustrate this on the previous
example:
Example A.1 (continued)
Let v(a) = 1, v(b) = 3, v(c) = 2. In the original model, we can rename
states as v(!) without modifying the players￿information: ￿ = f1;2;3g,
￿1 = ff1;3g;f2gg, ￿2 = ff1;2;3gg but if we naively replace the new state
!0 = fa;bg = f1;3g by its conditional expected value 2, we do not keep a
partition for player 1.
If the players￿information partitions are connected w.r.t. v, the previous
di¢ culty disappears as observed in Einy et al. (2002, p. 249).
Lemma 0
Let ￿ be a partition of ￿ and let ￿1 and ￿2 be two distinct elements of
￿. If ￿ is connected w.r.t. v, E(v j ￿1) 6= E(v j ￿2).
16Proof: The conclusion follows from the two following properties:
￿ Let ￿ be an element of ￿ and !;! 2 ￿ be de￿ned by v(!) = minv(￿)
and v(!) = maxv(￿) respectively. By connectedness,
￿ = f! 2 ￿ : v(!) ￿ v(!) ￿ v(!)g
￿ Let ￿1, ￿2 be two distinct elements of ￿. By connectedness (de￿ned as
in section 2.1., possibly with !1 = !2), v(￿1) \ v(￿2) = ;. ￿
To sum up, if we start with a state space and connected information
partitions which do not satisfy assumption A, we replace every cell ￿ of ￿N
by E(v j ￿) so as to ful￿ll A. The whole construction is illustrated below.
Example A.2
N = f1;2g, ￿ = fa;b;c;dg, p(!) = 1
4 8!, ￿1 = ffa;bg;fcg;fdgg,
￿2 = ffa;b;cg;fdgg, v(a) = 1, v(b) = 3, v(c) = 4, v(d) = 5.
￿0 = f2;4;5g, p(2) = 1
2, p(4) = p(5) = 1
4, ￿0
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